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 7 Safety Strategies in Hospitals 
 We have developed a series of ideas and proposals in the book which together laid 
the foundations for fi ve safety strategies described in Chap.  6 . We believe that think-
ing of safety strategies in this way has three major advantages: fi rst, we can enlarge 
the range of safety strategies and interventions available to us; secondly we can 
customise the blend of strategies to different contexts and third the high level archi-
tecture of safety strategies may help us think more strategically about safety both 
day to day and on a long term basis 
 In this chapter we begin the process of exploring how these strategies might sup-
port safety in the hospital. The following chapters address home care and primary 
care. In each case we provide a short introduction to relevant aspects of safety in 
each context but do not dwell on well-established fi ndings. Our primary purpose is 
to provide examples of interventions associated with each of the fi ve strategies and 
to give a sense of the potential value of such an approach. We recognise that, in the 
longer term, considerable further empirical work would be needed to develop and 
confi rm (or discount) our proposals. 
 A Little History 
 Hospital care has been the main focus of patient safety for two decades now and we 
can distinguish a series of phases of exploration and intervention. Each phase 
brought some success but simultaneously revealed barriers and limitations, which in 
turn stimulated a new phase of work in an evolving trial and error strategy. With 
experience and maturity, we understand more today about what is achievable and 
what has proved illusory. We are much more aware of how diffi cult it is to improve 
safety in both the short and long term. 
 What has been done in past decades? In the past 15 years we can distinguish 
three main phases each associated with different types of action and intervention. 
The earlier strategies have continued as the new ones emerged so that we now have 
‘a safety layer cake’ of practices and interventions. 
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 The Enthusiasm of the Early Years, 1995–2002 
 Systematic work on patient safety began in the mid 1990s with an emerging demarca-
tion between a broad concern with quality and a specifi c focus on harm. In Britain for 
instance the development of clinical risk management, initially targeted at the reduc-
tion of litigation, brought a new emphasis on the analysis and reduction of harmful 
incidents and events (Vincent  1995 ). The methods and assumptions however remained 
rooted in those of quality improvement; the aim was to identify and count errors and 
incidents and then fi nd ways of preventing them. Establishing reporting systems to 
detect and record incidents was at the core of the strategy. This approach was rapidly 
reconsidered as a result of both massive under-reporting, especially from doctors, and 
a gradual realisation of the impossibility of resolving the growing number of problems 
identifi ed in reporting systems (Stanhope et al.  1999 ). A wider vision was needed 
which was provided by systemic concepts and tools imported from industry. 
 The Advent of Professionalism 2002–2005 
 In the late 1990s, James Reason provided an inspirational vision for healthcare that 
provided a clear demarcation between traditional approaches to quality improvement 
and the specifi c problems that arise when addressing safety (Reason  1997 ; Reason 
et al.  2001 ). Safety researchers, clinicians and managers took the concepts, techniques 
and methods from industrial safety and applied them to healthcare. These included a 
stronger emphasis on the role of latent organisational conditions which led to the 
development of methods of incident analysis derived this model (Vincent et al.  1998 , 
 2000 ). Increasing attention was also given to human factors and ergonomics, follow-
ing the success in improving interface and equipment design in industry, the use of 
information technology and a scientifi c approach to working conditions, stress and 
fatigue management (Bates  2000 ; Sexton et al.  2000 ; Carayon  2006 ). Accreditation 
and certifi cation built on this new knowledge in requiring hospitals to establish risk 
management programmes and new patient safety indicators. Safety and risk manage-
ment acquired a much higher profi le and many new initiatives were developed across 
the healthcare system, but the impact on the safety of patients remained uncertain 
(Pronovost et al.  2006 ; Wachter  2010 ). The lack of clinical engagement was a major 
concern with patient safety remaining the province of enthusiasts and specialists – a 
curious situation given that safety, considered in terms of personal accountability, is 
perhaps the dominant concern of clinicians in their day-to-day work with patients. 
 Safety Culture, Multifaceted Interventions, 
and Teamwork 2005–2011 
 Surveys of safety culture demonstrated unequivocally that in many hospitals and 
other healthcare settings safety attitudes and values were far from ideal. Findings 
from many studies suggested an excessive blame culture, pressure on performance 
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to the detriment of safety, little transparency towards patients and variable levels of 
supervision and teamwork. There was also huge variability between hospitals, 
within clinical disciplines and across different settings (Tsai et al.  2013 ). Whereas 
safety culture was initially seen as potentially directly impacting on safety, there 
was now a growing awareness that it might provide only a necessary foundation 
(Flin et al.  2006 ; Vincent et al.  2010 ) 
 However, as we have discussed, evidence began to emerge of marked improve-
ments in specifi c safety problems at a local level and of the potential of wider applica-
tion of approaches such as checklists, care bundles and so on (Haynes et al.  2009 ; 
Shekelle et al.  2011 ). Those proven safety wins on the frontline encouraged the 
healthcare community to believe that safety would progressively improve as more 
interventions were put into place. Improving safety across organisations and popula-
tions however has proved a great deal more challenging. The major difference between 
current views and what was imagined in the mid 2000s is that safety wins and rewards 
are now expected in the middle to long term rather than in the very short term. 
 Reflections on Safety in Hospitals 
 We provide this brief overview primarily to highlight the fact that approaches to 
safety in hospitals have primarily been optimising approaches of one kind and 
another, although comparatively little attention has been given to optimising the 
system overall as opposed to improving specifi c practices. Accreditation and regu-
lations of the system might be thought to be examples of risk control and there are 
certainly examples of standards being set in order to minimise or avoid risks of 
certain kinds. However we suggest that most accreditation and regulation is essen-
tially aimed at assessing compliance or failure to comply with defi ned standards of 
care. Regulators are sometimes forced to acknowledge that standards cannot be met 
and that adaptations must be made but we suggest that the dominant vision of how 
safety is achieved is one of adherence to standards. 
 Safety in Hospital: Distinguishing Current and Future 
Strategies 
 We propose that thinking in terms of an overall blend of high level safety strategies 
customised to different contexts will be an effi cient and effective approach both to 
managing safety on a day to day basis and to improving safety over the long term. 
However before we start to illustrate how the fi ve different strategies might be 
employed in hospital we need to consider a critical issue, which is that staff and 
organisations often have to employ a particular strategy not because of the needs of 
that clinical environment but to compensate for other underlying problems in the 
system. For instance, services such as acute medicine rely very heavily on monitor-
ing, adaptation and recovery to observe, correct and recover from the inevitable 
departures from best practice and unforeseen problems that arise. However the fact 
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that a strategy is extensively used does not necessarily mean that it is desirable; it 
might in fact be overused to compensate for other defi ciencies such as poor reliabil-
ity or inadequate staffi ng (Box  7.1 ). We therefore need to make a distinction at this 
point between:
•  The blend of strategies currently used by an organisation 
•  The blend that might be desirable 
•  The strategies that might need to be developed or enhanced 
 Staff in all environments rely on workarounds such as obtaining information 
from patients rather than their health records, or using disposable gloves as tourni-
quets. In some cases, risks are taken such as making clinical decisions without 
information, or transferring used sharps to sharps bins in remote locations (Burnett 
et al.  2011 ). Often front-line coping and adaptation leads to short-term “fi xes” that 
put off more fundamental, long-term solutions. These clinical work-arounds may 
also allow managers to protect themselves from inconvenient truths and shift 
accountability for failure to front-line workers (Wears and Vincent  2013 ). 
 We therefore always need to think, when formulating the overall approach to 
safety, both about what the approach is now and what might be the most effective 
strategy in the longer term. We certainly believe that adaptive strategies should be 
further developed in the sense of being planned and to some extent formalised. 
However this is very different from the current reliance on ad hoc improvising to 
compensate for missing information, faulty equipment and the like. Figure  7.1 
 Box 7.1. Adaptation and Compromise on the Wards 
 Recently while on call at the weekend I found my team looking dispirited, 
ploughing through 27 pages of printed jobs that were required for patients 
based on ten wards. There was no way these could all be done by two junior 
doctors. They were doing what any sensible person would do and “working 
round” an impossible task, rationing what was essential or urgent and what 
could be omitted. 
 A large proportion of the workload is phlebotomy, taking bloods and chas-
ing the results. These should be taken by technicians but they have a fi xed 
contract for 4 h meaning that they only deal with a small proportion of the 
overall workload. Tests are ordered by weekday teams, and handed over to the 
weekend team to check results, often without a clear indication of the purpose 
of the tests or what to do with the results. The weekend teams only become 
aware when blood has not been taken when they check for the result, leading 
to considerable delay in monitoring patients. There is huge variability in the 
clarity of the requests, the background information given, the appropriateness 
of the job itself and what to do with results, all compounded by the inexperi-
ence and insecurity of junior doctors on call at weekends. 
 Inada Kim (personal communication 2015) 
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illustrates these ideas in the context of acute medicine suggesting that increasing 
reliability and controlling fl ow and demand would reduce the need for adaptation 
and improvisation. With this in mind we now illustrate the fi ve safety strategies in 
the context of the hospital; we devote most space to risk control, adaptation and 
mitigation as the other two strategies are already well described.
 Safety as Best Practice 
 We have already given a number of examples of optimising strategies in hospitals in 
Chap.  6 and earlier in the book. Clearly one needs to consolidate and develop the 
approaches that aim to improve adherence to best clinical practice and thereby make 
care safer for patients. Reduction of pressure ulcers, reduction of catheter- associated 
infections, improved hand hygiene, improved patient identifi cation and so on are 
obviously critical. Such standardised tasks and processes can be routinely audited to 
ensure that standards are maintained. All hospital environments, no matter how 
fl uid and dynamic the workfl ow, have many core basic procedures which need to be 
followed. Programmes to improve adherence to basis procedures are always an 
important foundation for safety though never a complete solution. 
 Improving the System 
 Although the broad fi eld of human factors and ergonomics is both huge and criti-
cally important in hospital settings we will not consider it in detail here. This is 
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essential approach to improving safety as well as effectiveness and experience. 
Under this broad heading we would include improvements to the administration of 
medication in terms of standardizing formularies and protocols, the introduction of 
information technology in all its forms, formalising roles and responsibilities in 
clinical teams, the use of care bundles and daily goals to organise ward care and all 
efforts to improve basic working conditions. Improving safety through best practice 
and raising standards tends to require additional effort from frontline staff, at least 
in the early stages. There is an equal need to give attention to improving the system 
in order to reduce the burden on staff and so allowing more time for safety monitor-
ing and improvement. Improvement of working conditions could involve improve-
ments to interface design, to the ergonomics of equipment, the physical working 
environment or the reduction of interruptions and distractions that greatly increase 
propensity to error. We provide one example to illustrate the potential of this kind of 
approach. 
 Reducing the Burden on Staff: Simplification and Decluttering 
 The improvement of the working lives of staff is a central aim of human factors 
work. If we want staff to spend time monitoring and improving safety we have to 
create time for it and not rely on enthusiasts working at weekends and in the eve-
nings. This means that less time must be allocated to something else and decisions 
must be made about what can be stripped out of the current work process. We will 
briefl y consider the issue of policies and procedures in the British NHS as an exam-
ple of how we might begin to simplify the system and reduce the burden on staff. 
 Within the National Health Service (NHS), a vast number of policies and guide-
lines govern all aspects of the work of the organisation. In an analysis of clinical 
guidelines related to frontline care Carthey and colleagues ( 2011 ) found that in the 
fi rst 24 h of a patient admitted for emergency surgery on a fractured neck of femur 
there were 76 applicable guidelines. A brief survey of 15 NHS hospitals in England 
who published their policies on their websites showed that they had between 133 
and 495 policies covering everything from dress code to medication dispensing. The 
average policy was 27 pages long with length varying between 2 and 122 pages 
(Fig.  7.2 ). An average hospital has 8000 pages of policies on their websites running 
to more than two million words (Green et al.  2015 ).
 The plethora of unusable quasi-legal policies is an unconscionable burden on the 
staff, a drain on resources and paradoxically a threat to safety. First, safety critical 
essential procedures and other trivial policies are not suffi ciently distinguished and 
all formal policies become degraded. Second, staff cannot possibly comply with 
even a fraction of the guidelines and procedures they have to contend with. Third, 
huge amounts of time and resource are devoted to producing policies which are 
more or less unusable in practice and distract from other potentially more fruitful 
approaches to safety. How many such procedures can we reasonably put in place in 
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Guidelines for investigations while patient 
is In A&E 
3. Standard ECG for elderly 
4. Urine dipstick 
5. Blood tests 
6. Chest X-ray 
7. Hip X-ray 
8. MRSA screen
GuideInes to monitor and manage patients 
while In A&E
9.  Vital signs (full set)
10. Pain score
11. Analgesia prescribed 
 (analgesic Ladder)
12. DVT prophylaxis 
13. Oxygen administation 
14. IV flulds 
15. Keep nil by mouth until definitive 
 plan made 
16. Transfer to orthopaedic ward within 
 4 h of arrival 
Pre-operative preparation guidelines




49. Pre-operative nursing preparation 
50. Pre-operative checks and 
 accompanying a patient to theatres
51. Antibiotics prophylaxis prescription 
 (intra + post-operative)
52. Consent + operation site mark
Intra-operative care guidelines
53. Theatre arrival checklist
54. Anaesthetic care (multiple)
55. Surgical safety checklist
56. Surgical operation (multiple)
57. Scrub nurse guidelines (multiple)
58. Radiation exposure
59. Sterility + laminar flow
60. Additional guidelines depending on 
 circumstances eg blood transfusion
Post-operative care guidelines
61. Immediate care of patient in theatre 
 recovery (multiple)
62. Post-operative infection prevention
63. Post-operative monitoring and 
 investigations
64. Wound care management
65. Post-operative nutrition & supplementation
66. Post-operative surgical care, eg timing of 






1. Procedure for triage assessment of 
 patient arriving in A&E
2.  Patient identification
Specific clinical guidelines 
17. Does patient satisfy fast track criteria 
 (elderly)
18. Full history and examination of every 
 organ system
19. Assessment of social circumstances
20. Exclude & treat other injuries
21. Patient’s orientation
22. Assessment for multiple pathology
23. Assessment of injury
24. Consider possibility of elderly abuse
25. If SpO2 <94 % check ABG and 
 administer oxygen
26. Treat cardiac arrhythmias according 
 to guidelines
27. Consider and treat community acquired 
 pneumonia
28. Consider need for bone protection 
 medication 
Ward admision/nursing checks
31. Ward orientation, information leaflet for 
 patient and relatives
32. Assess skin and pressure areas
33. Moving and handling guidelines
34. Nutrition assessment
35. Guidelines for clinical observations, vital 
 signs, weight and height.
36. Continence assessment
37. Information documentation





42. Patient positioning, traction, 
 immobilization and manual handling
43. Pressure area care
44. Bone protection medication guideline 
 for elderly care
68. Rehabilitation guidelines
69. Multidisciplinary assessment 
 for rehabilitation
70. Early post-operative mobilisation 
 (within 24h)
71. Slips, trips and falls
72. Guidelines for exercise regime 
 and rehabilitation
Discharge planning
73. Safe discharge and follow up
74. Involve social services if appropriate
75. Bone health assessment and treatment 
 at discharge
 Fig. 7.2  Guidelines for fractured neck of femur in the fi rst 24 h 
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one environment? It is ironic that so many policies and procedures are written with 
the aim of providing assurance and improving safety and yet the net effect is to 
degrade safety. They need to be drastically culled and simplifi ed to produce a usable 
set of operating procedures analogous to those used in other high risk industries 
(Green et al.  2015 ). 
 Risk Control 
 Risk control strategies are used in healthcare in highly standardized and regulated 
environments such as pharmacy, blood products and radiotherapy where there are 
strict controls built into the delivery systems and restrictions on who can deliver 
therapies and what competencies they need. Risk control strategies could poten-
tially be used much more widely particularly as a restraint on unnecessary or dan-
gerous informal adaptation. Most importantly they could be used much more 
explicitly, with greater clarity and embraced as part of the patient safety armament. 
In this section we give examples of risk control strategies at both frontline and 
executive levels. 
 Control of Medication 
 Restrictions on the prescription and administration of drugs is a classic and widely 
used risk control strategy. For instance:
•  There are clear guidelines about who can and cannot administer intrathecal 
chemotherapy (Franklin et al.  2014 ). 
•  Junior doctors are generally not permitted to prescribe certain drugs such as 
chemotherapy, oral methotrexate and other substances 
•  There are legal controls on the use of many drugs such as diamorphine and other 
opiates 
•  Nurses have to pass a test of competency to be permitted to administer intrave-
nous medications 
 These restrictions are generally accepted but not thought of as a risk control 
strategy or as a patient safety initiative. We list them simply to make the point that 
risk control is already used and already accepted. The next example is rather differ-
ent in being an example of the potential for risk control. 
 Potential for ‘Go and No-Go’ Controls in Surgery 
 Pre-fl ight checks require a conscious decision to proceed, referred to as a “go/
no-go” decision. The civil aviation authorities set clear criteria governing the 
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acceptable conditions for fl ying and it is expected that aircrew will recognise situa-
tions in which risk cannot be adequately managed. In such circumstances they are 
empowered to cancel the fl ight and indeed have a clear professional responsibility 
to do so. In contrast in healthcare the underlying assumption is to cope and carry on 
even in the face of considerable risk to patients. There are comparatively few areas 
in which ‘no go’ is explicitly understood and respected in healthcare. 
 National guidelines on equipment standards exist in anaesthesia. If faults are 
detected in core equipment it must be replaced, and if a suitable replacement is 
not available the case should not proceed without a specifi c, documented reason 
(Hartle et al.  2012 ). There are parallels between aviation and the operating the-
atre. An operation is a complex process that depends on the correct functioning of 
a number of different components, both human and technical. There are certain 
types of equipment failures in which it is assumed no anaesthetist would proceed 
(for example the airway gas analyser is unavailable), a situation in which some 
anaesthetists would proceed (an ultrasound is unavailable for a case requiring 
central venous cannulation), and a situation in which most anaesthetists might be 
expected to proceed (hospital uninterruptible power supply is unavailable, but all 
primary systems are functional). In practice however, although specifi c guidelines 
exist, there are very few clear ‘no go’ standards and the decision is left to the the-
atre team who are inevitably infl uenced by productivity pressures and other  factors 
(Eichhorn  2012 ). 
 ‘No go’ conditions could be defi ned in surgery to protect both patients and teams 
by imposing an inviolable limit which can only be bypassed in cases of emergency. 
‘No go’ conditions are objective, absolute, minimum safety standards. They corre-
spond to the thresholds above which activities of care must stop. The no go value 
correspond to a stage beyond which there is no capacity for safe care whatever the 
other strategies. 
 Placing Limits on Care 
 As we write this section in January 2015 a number of British hospitals have declared 
a ‘major incident’. This does not necessarily relate to any specifi c incident but is a 
statement that they have reached crisis point and are unable to cope with the volume 
or type of patients they are receiving. This can happen in winter when demands are 
high, but also at other times, for example if there is a major road accident or a large 
number of older patients with pneumonia. This formal declaration allows the execu-
tive team to take a number of steps:
•  One of the fi rst measures is to start postponing routine activity, such as knee and 
hip operations or outpatient appointments. 
•  Cancelling leave and calling in more staff 
•  Making announcements to the public that the hospital is under pressure and not 
to attend the emergency department unless absolutely necessary 
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•  In exceptional circumstances diverting ambulances so no emergency patients 
arrive. However, this is only used as a last resort as it increases demands on 
nearby sites. 
 This is a classic risk control strategy akin to grounding fl ights when an airport 
cannot cope with fl ight volume or in response to bad weather. Many hospitals take 
these measures in response to crisis but without necessarily having a clear cut pre-
pared strategy in place. Risk control in its fullest sense though demands an explicit, 
preferably public approach to the problem to allow a considered strategic response 
rather than an ad hoc muddling through. Again, these critical strategies are not con-
sidered in the ambit of patient safety and are not studied, categorised, developed or 
taught. 
 Monitoring, Adaptation and Response 
 We have repeatedly emphasised that failures and departures from standards are not 
the exception but the day to day reality of healthcare. Safety is achieved partly by 
attempting to reduce and control such failures but also, in recognition of the impos-
sibility of this task, by actively monitoring and managing problems that arise. The 
critical question is whether we leave this to ad hoc improvisation or try to build this 
capacity into the system (Vincent et al.  2013 ). Many proposed safety initiatives fall 
into this category but few have been implemented in a thoroughgoing and strategic 
manner. We provide some a small number of examples but there is huge scope for 
the development, formalisation, training and implementation of considered 
approaches to monitoring and adaptation. 
 Patients and Families as Problem Detectors 
 The active engagement and empowerment of patients and carers in an increasingly 
complex system poses huge challenges on many fronts. Patients and carers will 
have an increasingly important role in maintaining safety as home care expands, 
which will be discussed in the following chapter. At this point we simply want to 
highlight that almost all safety interventions that are aimed at patients fall into the 
category of monitoring, adaptation and response. In the hospital context patients 
and carers are in many cases being asked to compensate for problems of poor reli-
ability and to form an additional defence against potential harm (Davis et al.  2011 ). 
 Many patient focused safety interventions are aimed at encouraging people to 
speak up if they notice problems with medicines, identifi cation or other issues. 
More challengingly patients are asked to confront staff who have not washed their 
hands to support infection control (Pittet et al.  2011 ). Some of these interventions 
are entirely reasonable and in fact necessary; patients have a privileged and unique 
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view of their own care and we need their insights into how safety is compromised. 
But we should be clear that patients are often being asked not only to check for 
problems that arise in complex care but to detect and compensate for problems that 
are not of their making. 
 Team Training in Monitoring, Adapting and Response 
 Teams, when working well, have the possibility of being safer than any one indi-
vidual because a team can create additional defences against error by monitoring, 
double-checking and backing each other up: when one is struggling, another assists; 
when one makes an error, another picks it up (Vincent et al.  2010 ). Several authors 
have described how healthcare teams in emergency departments (Wears and Woods 
 2007 ) and operating theatres (Carthey et al.  2003 ) anticipate and thwart potential 
safety events. This can extend to more formal collaborative cross-checking, where 
one person, role, group or unit provides feedback about the viability or possible 
gaps in another’s plans, decisions, or activities (Patterson et al.  2007 ). Allied to this 
is the development of a safety culture in which speaking openly about error is sup-
ported and indeed encouraged. Once one realises that errors and failures are inevi-
table, at least when the system is under pressure, the rationale for openness about 
error becomes clear. This kind of preparation is particularly critical in the more fl uid 
and dynamic clinical environments where uncertainty is common and lapses fre-
quent. For example, the WHO Surgical Safety Checklist is usually thought of as a 
means of checking processes such as the giving antibiotics in a timely fashion. 
However the checklist also prompts a brief period of refl ection (the ‘time out’) in 
which members of the theatre team highlight potential problems and, by introduc-
ing each other, increases the chance of team members speaking up if problems are 
identifi ed (Haynes et al.  2009 ; Kolbe et al.  2012 ). 
 Briefings and Debriefings, Handovers and Ward Rounds 
 Operational meetings, handovers, ward rounds and meetings with patients and car-
ers are all sources of intelligence that allow the monitoring of safety For example, 
operational meetings held by senior managers can unblock beds and improve the 
fl ow of patients through a hospital, identify safety issues relating to infection out-
breaks, and thwart the potential for unsafe discharge of patients. Briefi ngs carried 
out by operating theatre teams provide an opportunity to identify and resolve equip-
ment problems, staffi ng and theatre list order issues before a case starts. Debriefi ngs 
carried out at the end of the theatre list support refl ective learning on what went well 
and what could be done better tomorrow. Increasingly, briefi ngs and debriefi ngs are 
being introduced in other healthcare domains such mental health teams (Campbell 
et al.  2014 ). 
 Monitoring, Adaptation and Recovery
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 Mitigation 
 The treatment and remediation of physical problems is obviously necessary when a 
patient has suffered some harm or complication. However psychological support is 
equally important both for patients and staff. Organisations vary hugely in the extent 
to which they are willing, prepared and able to provide support emotionally, practi-
cally and fi nancially. Some hospitals have very well established systems for respond-
ing when patients have been harmed and highly developed mitigation strategies; 
others simply react and adapt. 
 Support Systems for Staff and Patients 
 The basic needs of injured patients have been understood for 20 years. We would 
all, in varying degrees, like an apology, an explanation, to know that steps had been 
taken to prevent recurrence and potentially fi nancial and practical assistance 
(Vincent et al.  1994 ). We know that staff suffer a variety of consequences from 
being the ‘second victim’ as Albert Wu eloquently expressed it, not implying that 
the experiences of staff were necessarily comparable to those of injured patients 
(Wu  2000 ). We should also consider that a member of staff who has been seriously 
affected may well be performing poorly and be a risk to future patients; this again is 
rarely addressed. There are a few pioneering examples of programmes of support 
for both patients and staff (Box  7.2 ) but this is an area of safety management which 
needs substantial development (Iedema et al.  2011 ). 
 Box 7.2. Medically Induced Trauma Support Services (MITSS) 
 Linda Kenney, the founder of MITSS, experienced a grand mal seizure during 
an operation while cared for by an anaesthetist, Frederick van Pelt. Together 
they founded MITSS which provides support for both patients and staff. The 
Peer Support Programme uses colleagues as the primary support, following 
an approach that has been successfully used in the police, fi re and emergency 
medical services. The programme aims to recruit credible, experienced clini-
cal staff with personal understanding of the impact of error who are immedi-
ately available to provide confi dential refl ection and support. An education 
and training programme runs in parallel that aims to challenge the culture of 
denial of emotional response to serious errors and events. The hospital con-
cerned made an active commitment to disclosure and apology and developed 
an Early Support Activation (ESA) programme for patients and families. The 
long-term strategy is to have a comprehensive emotional support for patients, 
families and care providers (van Pelt  2008 ). 
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 The University of Michigan Health System pioneered a programme which 
included both support for patients and staff but also active intervention to provide 
compensation if appropriate and reduce the need for costly and potentially acri-
monious litigation. The organisation performs active surveillance for medical 
errors, fully discloses errors to patients, and offers compensation when it is at 
fault. Evaluation of the programme found a decrease in new legal claims, number 
of lawsuits per month, time to claim resolution, and costs after implementation 
of the program of disclosure with offer of compensation. This approach did not 
increase legal claims and costs even in the notoriously litigious United States 
(Kachalia et al.  2010 ); in fact some decline in litigation was reported in Michigan 
generally through the latter part of the study period. Several New York hospitals 
have now implemented similar ‘communication and resolution programmes’. To 
be successful they require the presence of a strong institutional champion, invest-
ment in developing and marketing the program to sceptical clinicians, and mak-
ing it clear that the results of such transformative change will take time (Mello 
et al.  2014 ). 
 Regulatory and Political Determinants of Approaches to Safety 
 We have illustrated our fi ve strategies within hospitals from the perspectives of both 
managers and frontline clinicians. To some degree they can determine the strategies 
they use to enhance safety. However they are also constrained by the wider regula-
tory and political environment. Regulators and politicians also have to decide on 
safety strategies for the wider system and their actions also determine the nature and 
feasibility of safety strategies within the organisations they infl uence. The two 
examples below show that the wider regulatory and political environment has a 
powerful infl uence not only on the form of healthcare that is delivered but on the 
safety strategies that can be adopted. 
 In France, the regulations governing radiotherapy, which are the province of 
the Nuclear Safety Agency (ASN), are much stricter than those governing the 
use of chemotherapy which is overseen by Haute Autorite de Sante (HAS). As 
a result, radiotherapists work to an ultra-safe model with many stipulations 
about the conditions of operation and an absolute requirement to minimise all 
errors and adverse events. ASN never hesitates to audit and suspend approval in 
cases of overdose or other serious problems. In contrast, oncologists have much 
greater freedom of action and are able to begin with a high dose (to bring maxi-
mum benefi t) and reduce the dose as necessary depending on the patient’s toler-
ance of unacceptable side effects. There are strict controls on the pharmaceutical 
production and on the preparation of chemotherapy, but comparatively few 
restraints on decisions about dose which are determined by the expert judge-
ment of oncologists. These differences are in large part due to the different high-
level requirements coming from the relevant authorities. Risk controls are 
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imposed on radiotherapy, while much autonomy and adaptation is allowed for 
chemotherapy. 
 Different political contexts and levels of funding obviously infl uence the 
healthcare that can be delivered but also affect the safety strategies that can be 
employed. In this respect there are marked differences between approaches 
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adopted in Europe and the United States in the surgical treatment of older patients 
with complex problems (Fig.  7.3 ). In Europe approximately 8.5 % of patients 
having major surgery are admitted to intensive care at some point in their hospi-
tal stay; mortality can be 4 % for all patients overall and as high as 20 % for older 
patients who are a poor anaesthetic risk. In contrast in the United States, 61 % of 
similar patients are admitted to intensive care; mortality is 2.1 % for all patients 
and 10–15 % for older patients with anaesthetic risk. These improvements in 
outcome in the United States are impressive but come at a considerable cost. In 
2013, critical care services alone accounted for 4 % of all US health care expen-
ditures, or nearly 1 % GDP (Neuman and Fleisher  2013 ). Europe has not made 
that choice which in turn means that different strategies must be employed which 
have a much stronger emphasis on the detection of problems and rapid response 
to mitigate the expected poorer outcomes (Fig.  7.3 ). In fact differences in mortal-
ity between high and low-volume hospitals are not associated with large differ-
ences in complication rates. Instead, these differences seem to be associated with 
the ability of a hospital to effectively rescue patients from complications. 
Strategies focusing on the timely recognition and management of complications 
once they occur may be essential to improving outcomes at low-volume hospitals 
(Ghaferi et al.  2009 ,  2011 ).
 Safety in Context: The Many Hospital Environments 
 We have begun to set out the safety strategies that may be employed in hospi-
tals, illustrating the broad strategies and the associated interventions. We rec-
ognise that much work is needed to explore this approach and map both actual 
and potential safety strategies and interventions. Another critical task is to 
consider how the strategies should be chosen and adapted to the many differ-
ent environments within the hospital and in the light of the increasing com-
plexity of care and the pressures on hospitals to provide safe care 24 h a day, 
7 days a week. 
 We have previously argued that there are areas of the hospital which con-
form to our ultra-safe model, others which rely on a high reliability approach 
and a number in which care is highly adaptive, albeit still with a bedrock of 
core procedures. In some of these settings safety is best achieved by a mixture 
of automation, reliable equipment and adherence to core standards and proce-
dures. In other environments these approaches remain important but need to be 
complemented by a greater reliance on risk control, adaptation and mitigation. 
Table  7.1 provides a general illustration of how we might employ different 
strategies to different contexts in the hospital as we develop the right blend of 
interventions and modes of operation. At the moment these ideas can only be 
proposed. However it would be possible, in fact necessary, to begin to identify 
and catalogue the strategies in day-to-day use using observational and ethno-
graphic approaches and potentially quantify the reliance on them in different 
contexts. 
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 Open Access  This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 
Noncommercial License, which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in 
any medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited. 
 Key Points 
•  In the past 15 years we can distinguish three phases of patient safety each 
associated with different types of action and intervention: the initial estab-
lishment of clinical risk management and the drive to reduce harmful inci-
dents; a second phase in which industrial safety concepts and methods 
were applied to healthcare; a third phase of focal clinical interventions, 
team and cultural development. The earlier strategies have continued as the 
new ones emerged so that we now have ‘a safety layer cake’. 
•  Many clinical services rely very heavily on ad hoc improvisation and adap-
tation to compensate for defi ciencies of organisation and poor reliability of 
basic processes. The fact that a strategy is extensively used does not neces-
sarily mean that it is desirable 
•  Safety may need to be approached differently in the varying clinical con-
texts within the hospital. All fi ve strategic approaches will be needed in the 
hospital. 
•  Safety as best practice. Reduction of pressure ulcers, reduction of catheter- 
associated infections, improved hand hygiene, improved patient identifi ca-
tion and adherence to core standards are critical in all environments. 
•  Improving the system includes standardising medication formularies and 
protocols, the introduction of information technology in all its forms, for-
malising roles and responsibilities in clinical teams, the use of care bundles 
and daily goals to organise ward care and all efforts to improve basic work-
ing conditions. 
•  Risk control includes: guidelines about who can and cannot administer 
intrathecal chemotherapy, legally controlled drugs with restrictions on 
their use and the implementation of go/no go conditions for surgical opera-
tions and other procedures 
•  Monitoring, adaptation and recovery includes: patients and families as prob-
lem detectors, teamwork and team training to adapt and recover, the use of 
briefi ngs, debriefi ngs and handover to anticipate and respond to problems. 
•  Mitigation. Organisations vary hugely in the extent to which they are willing, 
prepared and able to provide support emotionally, practically and fi nancially. 
Some hospitals have very well established systems for responding when 
patients have been harmed and highly developed mitigation strategies. 
•  The wider regulatory, economic and political environment has a strong 
infl uence on the nature of the safety strategies that are feasible to employ 
within the healthcare system. 
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